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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS. 
The plaintiffs were environmental associations who challenged 2003 
amendments to the regulations governing the issuing of permits to 
CAFOs under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) for the discharge of animal manure on fields. The plaintiffs 
argued that, under the amended regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23, 
there is no provision for EPA review of the nutrient management 
plans required from NPDES applicants and there is no provision 
that the nutrient management plan provisions be included in the 
NPDES permits. Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that the permit 
system was too reliant on self-regulation and failed to meet the 
statutory requirements that the permit system assure that permit 
holders comply with the effluent discharge limitations. The court 
agreed, holding that the regulations failed to provide sufficient 
regulatory review of the nutrient management plans to determine 
whether the plans met the statutory requirements before a permit 
was issued. The court also held that the failure by the regulations to 
require inclusion of the nutrient management plans in the NPDES 
permit was contrary to the statute, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, which 
expressly required effluent limitations be included in the permits. In 
addition, the court held that the regulations improperly failed to 
provide for an opportunity for public comment on the permits because 
the regulations failed to provide for public access to the nutrient 
management plans. The plaintiffs also challenged the regulations’ 
provision requiring all CAFOs to apply for a permit or provide proof 
that no pollutants are discharged. The plaintiffs argued that the 
regulations exceed the statutory authority which grants the EPA the 
power to regulate the discharge of pollutants, not the power to 
regulate potential polluters. The court agreed and held that the 
regulations were improper in requiring any information from anyone 
not discharging a pollutant, because the statute gives the EPA 
regulatory authority over only the discharge of pollutants. The 
plaintiffs argued that the regulations were improper because they 
allowed an exception for “agricultural stormwater” discharges, even 
those which came from point sources created by a CAFO. The court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs here, noting that the statute provided 
this exception and did not make any provision for rainwater runoff 
from CAFOs to be covered as a point source. Waterkeeper Alliance, 
Inc. v. EPA, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3395 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 2005). 
CONTRACTS

BREACH OF CONTRACT. The plaintiff contracted to sell 
weaner pigs to the defendant which intended to sell the pigs to third-
party finishers who, in turn, would sell the finished pigs to another 
company for processing. A recital in the sales contract stated that 
the defendant would purchase pigs from the plaintiff only so long as 
the finished pigs were purchased by the third corporation. In addition, 
the plaintiff testified that the sale contract depended upon the 
purchase of the finished pigs by the third company. When the third 
company refused to purchase the finished pigs, the defendant stopped 
purchasing weaner pigs under the contract. The defendant asserted 
the defense of frustration of purpose as an answer to the plaintiff’s 
breach of contract action. The trial court granted summary judgment 
based on the frustration of purpose doctrine to excuse performance 
under the contract. The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment, holding that the trial court correctly used extrinsic 
evidence to determine the primary purpose of the sales contract, the 
eventual sale of the finished pigs to the third corporation. When 
this primary purpose was blocked by the refusal of the other 
corporation to purchase the finished pigs, the defendant was excused 
from performing under the sales contract. Pieper, Inc. v. Land 
O’Lakes Farmland Feed, LLC, 390 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2004).




TRUSTS. The defendant was a promoter of “pure,” “common 
law,” “constitutional,” or “Massachusetts” trusts in which taxpayers 
placed their business assets. The trusts would then report the business 
income on Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and 
Trusts, prepared by the defendants. The returns would improperly 
claim deductions for “Trust Headquarters” (the taxpayer’s 
nondeductible personal living expenses, such as groceries, utility 
bills and mortgage principal payments); “medical” (the taxpayer’s 
nondeductible medical bills); “pension” (the taxpayer’s contributions 
to a private pension plan); and “insurance” (the taxpayer’s disability 
and life insurance premiums). The trusts would also pay the taxpayer 
a fee as trust manager in lieu of the normal business income which 
the taxpayer would have received. The court held that the defendants 
were engaged in the continuous activity of creating illegal tax 
avoidance trusts and enjoined the defendants from operating as tax 
return preparers. United States v. Ratfield, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,187 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
The IRS has adopted as final regulations which amend the 
regulations under the gift tax special valuation rules to provide 
that a unitrust amount or annuity payable for a specified term of 
years to the grantor, or to the grantor’s estate if the grantor dies 
prior to the expiration of the term, is a qualified interest, under 
I.R.C. § 2702(b), for the specified term. The regulations also clarify 
that the exception treating a spouse’s revocable successor interest 
as a retained qualified interest applies only if the spouse’s annuity 
or unitrust interest, standing alone, would constitute a qualified 
interest that meets the requirements of Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-
3(d)(3), but for the grantor’s revocation power. 70 Fed. Reg. 9222 




CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
denied certiorari in the following case. The taxpayer was a dentist 
and made contributions to a charitable organization. The charitable 
organization used the funds to purchase split-dollar life insurance 
policies on the taxpayer and agreed to split any proceeds with trusts 
established by the taxpayer. The organization provided receipts for 
the contributions but did not state that any benefits were received 
by the taxpayer. The trial court held that the taxpayer was not entitled 
to a charitable deduction based on the receipts which were not based 
on a good faith estimate of the value of the benefits received by the 
taxpayer.  The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as 
not for publication. Weiner v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,130 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2002-153. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following 
case. The taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a family trust which 
reached an agreement with a charitable organization for the 
organization to acquire a life insurance policy on the life of the 
wife. The trust made payments to the charity without restrictions 
but the charity used the contribution to pay the premium on the 
insurance policy. The trust made another payment the following 
year and the charity again made the premium payment. The trust 
and charity agreed to split the proceeds of the insurance upon the 
death of the wife. The agreement and insurance policy were 
terminated the third year. The court held that the taxpayers were 
not entitled to a charitable deduction for the contributions to the 
charity because the taxpayers received something of value in 
exchange. When the payments were made, the charity supplied 
the taxpayers with a receipt stating that no consideration was paid 
for the contributions, which was false. The court held that the false 
receipt resulted in the taxpayers failing to have sufficient 
substantiation of the contributions to support a deduction. Addis 
v. Comm’r, 2004-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,291 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff’g, 118 T.C. 528 (2002). 
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT. The taxpayer, currently a 
permanent U.S. resident alien, won the New York lottery in 1986 
when the taxpayer was a member of the Nigerian embassy staff 
and under diplomatic immunity. The lottery prize was payable over 
20 annual installments. The taxpayer argued that the entire lottery 
prize was taxable only in 1986 because the taxpayer was considered 
to have constructively received the entire prize; therefore, the 
taxpayer’s diplomatic immunity prevented income tax on the prize. 
The court held that, although the taxpayer could have transferred 
the right to the annual installments, the taxpayer did not 
constructively receive the entire prize in 1986 but was taxable for 
each installment when received. Jombo v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,197 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 
2002-273. 
CORPORATIONS 
LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS. The taxpayer corporation was 
owned by members of one family and operated a manufacturing 
business. The shareholders contributed money to the corporation, 
treated the contributions as loans at an above-market interest rate, 
and received payments from the corporation for various personal 
uses. The court held that the contributions were capital 
investments and not loans, disallowing an interest deduction to 
the corporation for the payments to the shareholders. The court 
discussed the following factors in holding the contributions to 
be investments and not loans: (1) the shareholders received a 
return in excess of the market rate; (2) the shareholders and 
corporation were inconsistent in their characterization and 
treatment of the obligation of the corporation to repay the 
contributions and failed to enforce the terms of the “loans;” 
and (3) the terms of the contributions were not negotiated at 
arm’s-length.  The court discussed several of the 11 factors used 
in Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1986), 
for determining whether shareholder contributions were loans 
or investments—(1) the corporation did not declare or pay 
dividends; (2) there was no fixed maturity date or enforceable 
obligation to repay the contributions; (3) payments made to 
the shareholders came from corporate profits; (4) no security 
was requested or given for the contributions; and (5) the 
corporation did not establish a sinking fund for repayment of 
the contributions. The court held that the above factors 
outweighed the corporation’s reporting of the payments as 
deductible interest and the shareholders’ reporting of the 
payments as interest income, the adequate capitalization of the 
corporation, and the fact that the contributions were not 
commensurate with the shareholder’s ownership share in the 
corporation. Indmar Products Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2005-32. 
REORGANIZATIONS. The IRS has adopted as final 
regulations governing the requirements for meeting the 
requirement of continuity of interest (COI) for purposes of the 
nonrecognition of gain or loss in a corporate reorganization. 
The regulations provide that in determining whether the COI 
requirement is satisfied, the consideration to be exchanged for 
the proprietary interests in the target corporation is valued as 
of the end of the last business day before the first date there is 
a binding contract to effect the potential reorganization, 
provided the consideration to be provided to the target 
corporation shareholders is fixed in such contract and includes 
only stock of the issuing corporation and money. For this 
purpose, a binding contract is an instrument enforceable under 
applicable law against the parties to the instrument. Because 
the terms of a tender offer that is subject to Section 14(d) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder are fixed in a manner similar to those 
of a binding contract, the regulations provide that such a tender 
offer, even if not pursuant to a binding contract, will be treated 
as a binding contract for purposes of these regulations. The 
regulations provide that the presence of a condition outside the 
control of the parties shall not prevent an instrument from being 
a binding contract. Finally, the regulations provide that 
consideration is fixed if the contract states the exact number of 
shares of the issuing corporation and the exact amount of money, 
if any, to be exchanged for the proprietary interests in the target 
corporation. 70 Fed. Reg. 9219 (Feb. 25, 2005). 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following case. The 
taxpayer was a shareholder and employee of a corporation. The 
taxpayer’s employment was terminated and the taxpayer sued 
37 Agricultural Law Digest 
the corporation for wrongful termination. The parties reached a 
settlement in which the corporation paid the taxpayer’s attorney’s 
fees, paid compensation for the wrongful termination and 
repurchased the taxpayer’s stock. The taxpayer argued that the 
attorney’s fees payment was excludible from income under 
I.R.C. § 62(c) as a reimbursement or other expense allowance 
arrangement. The court held that the payment did not qualify 
for I.R.C. § 62(c) treatment because the payment was not made 
under an accountable plan since the payments were not related 
to the performance of services for the corporation. Therefore, 
the attorney’s fees were deductible only as miscellaneous 
expenses. Biehl v. Comm’r, 351 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2003), affg, 
118 T.C. 467 (2002). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following 
case. The taxpayer’s employment as a regional manager of retail 
stores was terminated and the taxpayer brought suit against the 
employer for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, age discrimination under state law, fraud 
and deceit, and specific performance. The trial jury awarded 
damages to the taxpayer under the claim for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The taxpayer argued 
that the award was excluded from gross income because one of 
the claims involved a tort or tort-like issue. The court held that 
the judgment was included in the taxpayer’s gross income 
because the award was based entirely on the contract cause of 
action and was not based on any tort or tort-like claim involving 
personal injury. The taxpayer had hired attorneys for the lawsuit 
under a contingency fee arrangement and the judgment award 
check was made out jointly to the taxpayer and the attorneys. 
The trial court held that the attorneys’ fees were not excluded 
from the taxpayer’s income but could only be claimed as a 
miscellaneous deduction. The trial court followed Benci-
Woodward v. Comm’r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), aff ’g, T.C. 
Memo. 1998-395, decided in the circuit to which this case was 
appealed. The appellate court affirmed in an opinion designated 
as not for publication. Freeman v. Comm’r, 2003-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,335 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2001­
254. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following 
case. The taxpayer had filed suit against an employer for 
wrongful termination. The taxpayer signed a contingency fee 
agreement with the taxpayer’s lawyers, who received one-third 
of the initial judgment and an hourly rate for the appeal. The 
taxpayer excluded the amount paid to the lawyers under the 
contingency fee agreement. The District Court acknowledged a 
split in authority on this issue and a lack of authority from the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The District Court held that 
the contingency fee payment was not included in the taxpayer’s 
income because the fee was never a personal obligation of the 
taxpayer nor was that portion of the judgment ever in the control 
of the taxpayer. The District Court focused on the taxpayer’s 
rights to the money at the time the contingency fee agreement 
was executed and noted that the taxpayer had no right to the 
money at that time. On appeal the Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that Vermont law did not create a  property interest in 
the lawsuit recovery for the attorney’s contingent fee; therefore, 
the attorney fee portion of the settlement was included in the 
taxpayer’s income.  Raymond v. United States, 2004-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,124 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’g and rem’g, 2003-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,196 (D. Vt. 2002). 
The taxpayer had received a jury award for personal injuries. 
The court awarded prejudgment interest on the jury award. The 
IRS argued that the prejudgment interest was taxable income, 
although the main jury award was excluded from income as money 
received for personal injuries in a tort action. The trial court 
followed precedent in Francisco v. U. S., 267 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 
2001); Rozpad v. Comm’r, 153 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); and Brabson 
v. U.S., 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996), and held that prejudgment 
interest is included in taxable income because the interest is 
received in compensation for the delay in judgment and not for 
personal injuries. The court noted that, under Louisiana law, 
prejudgment interest was considered part of the reparations for 
injury, but the court held that the state characterization of the 
prejudgment interest award did not control for federal tax purposes. 
Chamberlain v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,194 
(5th Cir. 2005), aff’g, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,711 
(E.D. La. 2003). 
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for 
computer equipment purchased in one tax year; however, the 
taxpayer did not file Form 4562 with the income tax return for 
that year to claim expense method depreciation, under I.R.C. § 
179, for the computer equipment. The court held that, because the 
taxpayer did not make the Section 179 election for the computer 
equipment, the taxpayer was not entitled to a current deduction 
for the cost of the computer equipment but had to depreciate the 
cost. The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as not 
for publication. Visin v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,199 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2003-246. 
The taxpayer owned a property which was apparently (the 
redactions make this unclear) an open concert area with food 
vending areas, picnic areas and open ground concert seating areas. 
The property was improved with permanently situated property, 
including vending booths, concrete seating and tables, landscaping, 
lighting, sidewalks, fences and parking lots. The IRS ruled that 
the tangible personal property, land improvements and non-
residential real property were includible in MACRS Asset 
Guideline Class 79.0 “Recreation” and not Class 80.0 “Theme 
and Amusement Parks” for depreciation purposes.  Ltr. Rul. 
200508015, Dec. 2, 2004. 
The taxpayer built and operated two commercial buildings. The 
taxpayer incurred costs for acquiring development rights for 
building the properties, including zoning changes. The 
development rights would expire if the buildings were removed 
and the zoning changes did not vest with the taxpayers. The court 
held that the development rights were depreciable with the 
buildings because the rights had a useful life limited to the 
depreciable lives of the buildings. However, the court held that 
the costs of the zoning changes had to be capitalized with the land 
because the taxpayer did not have a vested right in the indefinite 
continuation of the zoning change. Maguire/Thomas  Partners 
Library Square Ltd., v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-34. 
DISASTER LOSSES. The IRS has designated the tsunamis 
that occurred in the Indian Ocean, in the affected areas of the 
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countries of Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania and Thailand, on December 26, 2004, as a qualified 
disaster for purposes of I.R.C. § 139. As such, any amount 
received by an individual as a qualified disaster relief payment 
will not be includable in that individual’s gross income. 
Qualified disaster relief payments include amounts paid to or 
for the benefit of an individual to reimburse or pay reasonable 
and necessary personal, family, living or funeral expenses (not 
compensated for by insurance or otherwise) incurred as a result 
of the tsunamis, or to reimburse or pay reasonable and necessary 
expenses (not compensated for by insurance or otherwise) 
incurred for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal residence 
or repair or replacement of its contents to the extent that the 
repair, rehabilitation or replacement is attributable to the 
tsunamis. Notice 2005-23, I.R.B. 2005-10. 
On February 15, 2005, the President determined that certain 
areas in Ohio were eligible for assistance under the Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5121) as a result 
of severe winter storms, flooding and mud slides, which began 
on December 22, 2004. FEMA-1580-DR. Accordingly, 
taxpayers in the affected areas who sustained losses may deduct 
them on their 2003 or 2004 federal income tax returns. On 
February 18, 2005, the President determined that certain areas 
in the Territory of American Samoa were eligible for assistance 
under the Act as a result of Tropical Cyclone Olaf, which began 
on February 15, 2005. FEMA-1581-DR. On February 17, 2005, 
the President determined that certain areas in Massachusetts 
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of record 
snowfall, which began on January 22, 2005. FEMA-3201-EM. 
On February 17, 2005, the President determined that certain 
areas in Nevada were eligible for assistance under the Act as a 
result of record snowfall, which began on January 2, 2005. 
FEMA-3202-EM. On February 17, 2005, the President 
determined that certain areas in Rhode Island were eligible for 
assistance under the Act as a result of record snowfall, which 
began on January 22, 2005. FEMA-3203-EM. Accordingly, 
taxpayers in the affected areas who sustained losses may deduct 
them on their 2004 federal income tax returns. 
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer was self-employed as an 
interior designer and claimed a deduction for a portion of the 
rent paid by the taxpayer for an apartment which was also used 
as the taxpayer’s residence. The total of the home office-related 
deductions exceeded the gross income from the interior design 
business, and the IRS disallowed the portion of the expenses 
in excess of the income, as provided by I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). 
The taxpayer argued that the Section 280A(c)(5) limitation did 
not apply to rent expense. The Tax Court disagreed, holding 
that the Section 280A(c)(5) limitation applied to expenses 
associated with a residence, and because the taxpayer’s 
apartment was used by the taxpayer as a residence, the rent 
expense was subject to the limitation. The court noted that the 
amount of disallowed expense could be carried over to the next 
tax year. The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated 
as not for publication. Visin v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,199 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2003­
246. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was a partner in a 
partnership formed to purchase an energy management system 
for a manufacturing facility. The IRS disallowed the taxpayer’s 
deduction for losses from the partnership because the 
partnership lacked a profit motive in the purchase of the 
equipment. The court found that (1) the equipment was 
purchased at a price more than 30 times the cost to the seller, 
(2) the partnership failed to operate the activity in a businesslike 
manner in that it did not keep separate accurate records, (3) the 
partners had no experience or expertise in energy management 
systems, (4) the equipment was not expected to appreciate in 
value, and (5) the activity produced only losses. The court held 
that the partnership activity was entered into without the intent 
to make a profit and disallowed deductions for losses from the 
activity.  Walford v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,206 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2003-296. 
IRA. The taxpayer was an investment advisor and securities 
broker-dealer. The taxpayer charged its IRA clients a wrap fee 
for services for the IRAs, including investment management, 
selling and purchasing securities and other investments, 
valuation and auditing assets and investment research. The wrap 
fees were based on the value of the assets in the IRA and not on 
the number or level of services provided each year. The IRS 
ruled that the wrap fees were not considered contributions to 
the IRA for purposes of limitation of annual contributions. Ltr. 
Rul. 200507021, Nov. 23, 2004. 
INTEREST RATE. The IRS has announced that, for the 
period April 1, 2005 through June 30, 2005, the interest rate 
paid on tax overpayments is 6 percent (5 percent in the case of 
a corporation) and for underpayments is 6 percent. The interest 
rate for underpayments by large corporations is 8 percent. The 
overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate overpayment 
exceeding $10,000 is 3.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 2005-15, I.R.B. 
2005-11. 
LEGAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer owned property which 
was part of a condominium association. The taxpayer had 
several disagreements with the management of the association 
which resulted in a pro se lawsuit by the taxpayer against the 
association. The taxpayer eventually hired an attorney who 
dismissed the litigation and pursued other litigation to force 
mediation of the dispute. The taxpayer argued that the legal 
expenses associated with the case were deductible because the 
desired result would have allowed the taxpayer to claim 
additional tax deductions. The court rejected the idea that the 
litigation’s effects determined the deductibility of the legal 
expenses, and focused, instead, on the nature of the litigation 
itself to determine the deductibility of the expenses. The court 
held that the litigation expenses were not deductible because 
they involved the personal residence of the taxpayer and not 
any business pursued by the taxpayer. The appellate court 
affirmed in a decision designated as not for publication. Colvin 
v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,192 (5th Cir. 
2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2004-67. 
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PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations 
governing designation of 401(k) pension plan contributions as 
Roth IRA contributions. Roth contributions are not excluded from 
gross income, and later distributions of Roth contributions are 
not subject to taxes on distributions; therefore, the regulations 
provide guidance for separate accounting of elective Roth 
contributions to 401(k) plans. 70 Fed. Reg. 10062 (March 2, 
2005). 
S CORPORATIONS 
BUILT-IN GAIN. Under the current rules, (Treas. Reg. §§ 
1.337(d)-4 through 1.337(d)-7, 1.1374-1 through 1.1374-10) if 
an owner C corporation, elects to be an S corporation when it 
owns all of the stock of another C corporation, the net unrealized 
built-in gain (NUBIG) will reflect the built-in gain or built-in 
loss in the other C corporation’s stock. That built-in gain or built-
in loss may be duplicative of the built-in gain or built-in loss in 
the other C corporation’s assets. If the other C corporation later 
transfers its assets to the owning C corporation in a liquidation to 
which I.R.C. §§ 332 and 337(a) apply, the built-in gain and built-
in loss in the other C corporation’s assets may be reflected twice: 
once in the NUBIG attributable to the assets the S corporation 
owned on the date of its conversion (including the stock of the 
other C corporation) and a second time in the NUBIG attributable 
to other C corporation’s former assets acquired by the S 
corporation in the liquidation of the other C corporation. A similar 
result would obtain if, on the date of its conversion to an S 
corporation, the owner C corporation owned less than 80 percent 
of the stock of the other C corporation and later acquired the 
assets of the other C corporation in a reorganization to which 
I.R.C. § 368(a) applies. The IRS has adopted as final regulations 
which adjust (increase or decrease) the NUBIG of the pool of 
assets that included the stock of the liquidated or acquired C 
corporation to reflect the extent to which the built-in gain or built-
in loss inherent in the redeemed or canceled C corporation stock 
at the time the pool of assets became subject to the tax under 
I.R.C. § 1374 has been eliminated from the corporate tax system 
in the liquidation or reorganization. The regulations provide that, 
if I.R.C. § 1374(d)(8) applies to an S corporation’s acquisition of 
assets, some or all of the stock of the corporation from which 
such assets were acquired was taken into account in the 
computation of NUBIG for a pool of assets of the S corporation, 
and some or all of such stock is redeemed or canceled in such 
transaction, subject to certain limitations, the NUBIG of the pool 
of assets that included the C corporation stock redeemed or 
canceled in the transaction (other than stock with respect to which 
a loss under I.R.C. § 165 is claimed) is adjusted to eliminate any 
effect any built-in gain or built-in loss in the redeemed or canceled 
C corporation stock had on the initial computation of NUBIG for 
that pool of assets. For this purpose, stock that has an adjusted 
basis that is determined (in whole or in part) by reference to the 
adjusted basis of any other asset held by the S corporation as of 
the first day of the recognition period (i.e., stock described in 
I.R.C. § 1374(d)(6)) is treated as taken into account in the 
computation of the NUBIG for the pool of assets of the S 
corporation. Adjustments to NUBIG under the regulations are 
subject to two limitations. First, the NUBIG is only adjusted to 
reflect the amount of the built-in gain or built-in loss that was 
inherent in the redeemed or canceled stock at the time the pool of 
assets became subject to tax under I.R.C. § 1374 that has not 
resulted in recognized built-in gain or recognized built-in loss at 
any time during the recognition period, including on the date of 
the acquisition to which I.R.C. § 1374(d)(8) applies. Second, an 
adjustment cannot be made if it is duplicative of another 
adjustment to the NUBIG for a pool of assets. Any adjustment to 
NUBIG under these rules will only affect computations of the 
amount subject to tax under I.R.C. § 1374 for taxable years that 
end on or after the date of the liquidation or reorganization. It will 
not affect computations of the amount subject to tax under I.R.C. 
§ 1374 for taxable years that end before the date of the liquidation 
or reorganization. 70 Fed. Reg. 8727 (Feb. 23, 2005). 
SALE AND LEASEBACK. The IRS has adopted  as final 
regulations which provide that eligible debt under I.R.C. § 263A(f) 
does not include a purchase money obligation given by the lessor 
to the lessee (or a party related to the lessee) in a sale and leaseback 
transaction under former I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) as enacted by ERTA. 
Accordingly, these obligations are excluded from the definition 
of eligible debt, and the interest accruing on the obligations is not 
subject to capitalization with respect to designated property under 
I.R.C. § 263A(f). The regulations apply to interest incurred in 
taxable years beginning on or after May 20, 2004, except that, in 
the case of property that is inventory in the hands of the taxpayer, 
the regulations apply to taxable years beginning on or after May 
20, 2004. However, taxpayers may elect to apply the regulations 
to interest incurred in taxable years beginning on or after January 
1, 1995, or, in the case of property that is inventory in the hands 
of the taxpayer, to taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 
1995. For purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-15(a)(2), the exclusion 
of purchase money obligations given by the lessor to the lessee 
(or a party related to the lessee) in a sale and leaseback transaction 
under former section 168(f)(8) as enacted by ERTA will be 
considered to be a reasonable position for the application of I.R.C. 
§ 263A(f) in taxable years beginning before January 1, 1995. 
Consequently, a taxpayer changing a method of accounting for 
property that is not inventory in the hands of the taxpayer to 
conform to the regulations may elect to include interest incurred 
after December 31, 1986, in taxable years beginning on or after 
December 31, 1986, and before January 1, 1995, in the 
determination of its adjustment under I.R.C. § 481(a). A taxpayer 
changing a method of accounting for property that is inventory in 
the hands of the taxpayer to conform to the regulations must 
revalue its beginning inventory in the year of change as if the 
new method of accounting had been in effect during all prior years. 
70 Fed. Reg. 8729 (Feb. 23, 2005). 
TAX SCAMS. The IRS has issued its annual “Dirty Dozen” 
consumer alert that cautions taxpayers about falling victim to a 
variety of tax scams topping its consumer watch list: (1) misuse 
of trusts, see Publication 2193; (2) frivolous arguments, including 
various constitutional arguments and claims that filing and paying 
taxes is voluntary; (3) return preparer fraud, noting that taxpayers 
are ultimately responsible for the accuracy of their tax returns; 
(4) credit counseling agencies; (5) “claim of right” doctrine, in 
which a taxpayer attempts to deduct an amount equal to the entire 
amount of his or her wages, labelling the deduction as a “necessary 
expense for the production of income,” or “compensation for 
personal services actually rendered;” (6) “no gain” deduction, 
under which filers attempt to eliminate their entire adjusted gross 
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income by deducting it on Schedule A with the words “No Gain 
Realized” included in the filing; (7) corporation sole, applying for 
incorporation under the pretext of being a “bishop” or “overseer” 
of a one-person, phony religious organization or society; (8) identity 
theft involving taxes, including fictional correspondence using IRS 
forms, fraudulent tax preparers and false audits; (9) abuse of 
charitable organizations and deductions; (10) offshore transactions 
by illegally hiding income in offshore bank and brokerage accounts 
or using offshore credit cards, wire transfers, foreign trusts, 
employee leasing schemes, private annuities or life insurance; (11) 
returns that contain all zeros; and (12) employment tax evasion by 
encouraging employers not to withhold federal income tax or other 
income taxes based on an incorrect interpretation of I.R.C. § 861. 
IR-2005-19. 
TRUSTS 
SALE OF TRUST PROPERTY. The plaintiff was the trustee 
of a trust established by a parent and consisting of farmland. The 
trustee and the other children of the decedent were the beneficiaries 
of the trust, with some as life tenants and the others as remainder 
beneficiaries. The trustee sought to sell some of the farmland to the 
trustee for use as a residence. The other beneficiaries objected to 
the sale and expressed a desire that the farmland was to be shared 
by all family members and not divided. The plaintiff argued that 
Nebraska law required the trustee to diversify trust assets to produce 
a higher rate of return and security for the beneficiaries. The plaintiff 
claimed that the proceeds of the sale could be invested at a higher 
rate of return. The evidence supported the trustee’s claim that the 
sale was for full market value. Although the court acknowledged 
the trustee’s duty to preserve the trust property, the court held that 
the duty could be waived by the trustor’s desire that the property 
not be sold. In addition, the court noted that the trustee’s duty to 
preserve trust property also required that any actions by the trustee 
not increase the risk of loss. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that the investment of the sale proceeds would produce 
the same or lower risk of loss as well as the same or increased 
return. The court also cited precedent that the sale of trust property 
to the trustee was not favored over the objections of the 
beneficiaries. The court upheld the trial court’s denial of permission 
to sell the trust property to the trustee. In re Trust Created by 
Harold Inman, 269 Neb. 376 (2005). 
CITATION UPDATES 
Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 391 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 
2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,476 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (estate 
property valuation) see 15 Agric. L. Dig. 180 (2004). 
In re Corn-Pro Nonstock Cooperative, Inc., 318 B.R. 153 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2004) (involuntary bankruptcy petition) see p. 3 
supra. 
INTHE NEWS 
COTTON. On March 3, the appellate body of the WTO upheld 
an interim panel’s finding that the U.S. illegally subsidizes its cotton 
farmers in violation of international trade rules. The case, brought 
by Brazil, is the first successful challenge to U.S. domestic farm 
aid under the WTO and is likely to spur challenges to support for 
other crops. The appellate body upheld findings made in 2004 that 
U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers broke trade rules, depressed world 
prices and damaged Brazilian producers. Brazil alleged that 
subsidies paid to U.S. cotton farmers from 1999 to 2002 (and those 
mandated through 2007 under the 2002 Farm Bill) violate WTO 
rules. Brazil argued that the subsidies have depressed world cotton 
prices, thereby causing harm to Brazilian cotton farmers. Brazil 
also took issue with the Upland Cotton User Marketing Certificate 
Program (Step 2). The 1990 Farm Bill established the Step 2 
program under which $1.68 billion has been paid over the last 8 
years to 285 cotton exporters. Step 2 payments are provided to 
U.S. companies that export or mill cotton in the amount of the 
difference between the price of U.S. cotton and cheaper cotton 
available on the world market. The payments are made to ensure 
that U.S. cotton is not disadvantaged in world markets collected at 
least $35 million (amounting to about half of the total payments). 
Brazil claimed that the program is an export subsidy that pays U.S. 
exporters to buy U.S. cotton and export it onto the world market at 
prices less than the cost of production. The U.S. claimed that direct 
payments are decoupled and are not trade distorting because they 
are not linked to current production (i.e., they are not “subsidies”). 
The decision is viewed as a victory for developing countries and 
opponents of farm support payments, who claim the payments 
unfairly favor farmers in wealthier countries. 
40

